Books & Manuscripts, including Americana

Together, 52 volumes, with contributions, many in journals and periodicals, by Thomas C. Schnelling, Robert Aumann, John Von Neumann, John Forbes Nash Jr., Lloyd S. Shapley, Jean Ville, Emile Borel, Augustin Counot, Ernst Zermelo, Reinhard Selten, and others. Most are in original bindings and housed in custom folding cases. A complete list of titles is available upon request.

Game theory is a branch of mathematics concerned with the analysis of strategic interaction, in which the outcome for each participant depends upon the decisions of others. Formally developed in the twentieth century, most notably through the work of John von Neumann and later John Nash, it provides a rigorous framework for modeling competition, cooperation, and equilibrium. Classic formulations include the “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” illustrating the tension between individual incentive and mutual benefit, and the “zero-sum game,” in which one party’s gain is exactly balanced by another’s loss. Such models have informed modern approaches to economic markets, diplomatic negotiation, military strategy, and broader decision-making under conditions of interdependence.

This archive includes:

1) ZEMELO, Ernst. "Uber eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels." In: Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Mathematicians, Vol. 2, pp.501-504. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1913. Original blue cloth. This work, known as the first "theorem" of game theory, asserts that in chess either white can force a win, or black can force a win, or both sides can force at least a draw.

2) BOREL, Émile. "La théorie du jeu et les équations intégrales à noyau symétrique." In: Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires..., Vol. 173, No. 25, pp.1304-1308. Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1921. Original printed wrappers (rebacked). CONTAINS BOREL'S FIRST PAPER ON GAME THEORY. [With:] "The Theory of Play Integral Equations with Skew Symmetric Kernals." In: Econometrica. Vol. 21, No.1. Baltimore, 1953. Contains the English translation of the above.

3) BOREL. Éléments de la Théorie des Probabilités. Paris: Librairie Scientifique J. Hermann, 1924. Original printed wrappers (rebacked). Borel was the first to define games of strategy.

4) BOREL. A sammelband of 3 works appearing in Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires des Séances de l'Académie des Sciences, comprising: "Sur les jeux où le hasard se combine avec l'habileté des joueurs" (Vol. 178, No. 1, pp.24-25, 2 January 1924); "Un Théorème sur les systèmes de formes linéaires à déterminant symétrique gauche" (Vol. 183, No. 21-22, pp.925-927, 993, 22 November 1926); and "Sur les systèmes de formes linéaires a déterminant symétrique gauche..." (Vol. 184, No. 2, pp.52-53, 10 January 1927). Modern cloth.

5) VON NEUMANN, John. "Sur la théorie des jeux." In: Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires des Séances, Vol. 186, No. 25, pp.1689-1691. Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1928. Original printed wrappers (rebacked). Von Neumann announces that he has proven the mini-max theorem, but does not give proof.

6) VON NEUMANN. "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele." In: Mathematische Annalen. Vol. 100, No. 1-2, pp.295-320. Berlin: Julius Springer, 1928. Original printed wrappers (rebacked). CONTAINS VON NEUMANN'S FIRST AND MOST FAMOUS PAPER ON GAME THEORY, "THE THEORY OF PARLOR GAMES." Origins of Cyberspace 953.

7) VON NEUMANN and Oskar MORGENSTERN. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Later cloth. FIRST EDITION. [With:] Another copy in original cloth. Second edition.

8) WALD, Abraham. "Statistical Functions which Minimize the Maximum Risk" and "Generalization of a Theorem by V. Neumann Concerning Zero Sum Two Person Games." In: Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 46, pp.265-280, 281-286. Modern cloth. In these papers, Wald applied von Neumann's minimax theorem to statistical decision theory to develop a generalized approach to games with a continua of strategies.

9) KUHN & TUCKER, editors. Contributions to the Theory of Games. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. 4 volumes. Original printed wrappers. FIRST EDITIONS of vols. 1 and 4.

10) NASH, John Forbes, Jr. "Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games." In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp.48-49. Easton, Pennsylvania: Mack Printing, 1950. Modern cloth. NASH'S FIRST EXPRESSION OF THE 'NASH EQUILIBRIUM' — LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR HIS 1951 LANDMARK PAPER "NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES." This is the first of three papers from Nash's PhD thesis in game theory, presenting his first proof of the existence of an equilibrium. 

11) NASH. "Two Person Cooperative Games." In: Econometrica, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp.128-140, January 1953. Original printed wrappers. Nash extends his earlier work on the Nash Equilibrium beyond zero-sum games.

12) KAHN, Herman. "War Gaming." P-1167. 30 July 1957. -- WOHLSTETTER, Albert. "The Delicate Balance of Terror." P-2473. 22 August 1958. -- SCHNELLING, Thomas C. "Surprise Attack and Disarmament." P-1574. 10 December 1958. -- Together, 3 works in 3 volumes, all published in Santa Monica by Rand, all in original wrappers.

13) FLOOD, Merrill M. "Some Experimental Games." In: Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp.5-26, October 1958. Original printed wrappers. The "prisoner's dilemma" is a famous example in game theory that illustrates why two completely rational individuals tend not to cooperate, even when it is in their best interests to do so. This dilemma was first published in a confidential Rand Memorandum in 1950. The paper was then updated and published in 1958 in this issue.